ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
During the last three decades, the world economy has experienced a great proliferation of economic openness policies. Before 1986, developing countries were not very involved in trade openness negotiation processes and multilateral trade agreements were generally limited to industrialized economies.
But the situation has changed after 1994 with the achievement of the Uruguay round, which is, according to the IMF, the ‗most complete multilateral trade negotiation in economic history'.
Situation has also changed after this date when the World Trade Organisation (WTO) succeeded to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). WTO negotiations, which began in Qatar in 2001, were designed to address issues which had not been addressed during the Uruguay round.
The Doha Round, also called Doha Program for Development, due to the high priority given to developing countries, covered manufactured goods, agriculture and services. It also provided the establishment of special arrangements, aid and assistance in order to encourage these countries to engage in trade liberalization process (International Monetary Fund, 2006) .
On the academic field, the debates surrounding the impact of liberal orientation on economic performances of developing countries have provided different findings. Some authors argued that trade openness has improved economic performances, but others concluded that this reform is not statistically linked to growth and other development indicators.
The contribution of present work in this academic corpus can be summarised through the following purposes.
Firstly, we consider that theoretical controversy about the relationship between trade and growth was largely due to conceptual differences in trade openness measures.
Empirical literature experienced several trade openness indicators, but even if these indices are designed to measure the same concept, the manner by which they were conceptualised differs.
Empirically, these different appreciations of trade openness degrees were reflected in estimation's results and led to divergent conclusions about the impact of trade on growth and other economic variables. So the reliability of results; and thus of theoretical conclusions; depends largely on the quality of the trade measures used in empirical framework.
Secondly, we defend the thesis that trade openness have weakly contributed in improving economic growth in developing countries during the last three decades and the support of these countries for liberal policies was motivated by the desire to obtain loans and aids from international organisations.
In order to demonstrate our purposes, the present work will be organised as follow:
In the next section we will expose the conceptual shortcomings of three trade measures which were been commonly used in empirical studies that supported the existence of a strong positive association between trade and growth. These indexes are those of Sachs and Warner (1995) , Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003) .
This analysis can be read as a calling into question of academic position supporting the existence of large association between trade openness and economic growth.
In the third section we will demonstrate that the (X+M/GDP) ratio, used as a variable of interest in our model, is less exposed to methodological shortcomings than trade measures mentioned above. The aim of this section is to provide academic support to the empirical framework that we will achieve in the fourth section.
In this fourth section, we will demonstrate that (X+M/GDP) ratio, when it is associated to Kaufmann et al. (2012) governance indicators, has a very low marginal effect in explaining growth variations in 82 developing countries and during the 1996-2012 period.
In this section we will provide theoretical arguments in order to justify our findings while in the fifth section we will demonstrate that liberal orientation of developing countries was motivated by their desire to obtain loans and aid from international organisations. Section six concludes.
TRADE INDICATORS CONCEPTUAL SHORTCOMINGS, A CAUSE OF BIAS IN ESTIMATIONS RESULTS
The causality between trade openness and economic performances has been debated by several contemporary studies. However, these studies have provided divergent conclusions.
According to some authors, including Gwartney et al. (1998) , Dollar and Kraay (2002) , Warner (2003) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003) , openness to international trade is strongly linked to economic performances. Gwartney et al. (1998) find that in a panel of 82 countries and for the 1980-1995 period, liberal economic reforms explain 31% of growth variations. They argue that « economic freedom explains by itself a substantial amount of the variation across countries in the long-term growth rates ». Dollar and Kraay (2002) concluded that « the post-1980 globalizers countries have seen large increases in trade and significant declines in tariffs. Their growth rates accelerated between the 1970s and the 1980s and again between the 1980s and the 1990s, even as growth in the rich countries and the rest of the developing world slowed. The post-1980 globalizers are catching up to the rich countries, but the rest of the developing world (the non-globalizers) is falling further behind ». Warner (2003) argues that there is a negative relationship between the -non weighted middle tariff rates on the level of capital and intermediate goods‖ and growth 1 . And for Wacziarg and Welch (2003) , « liberalization has, on average 2 , robust positive effects on growth (...) and investment rates within countries ».
1 Warner (2003) . used the data base of Barro and Lee (1994) .
2 These two authors use the term "on average" to express the effect of liberalization on growth and investment because their economic liberalization indicator is an aggregated one, formed by several indicators.
However, other studies consider that trade openness reform hasn't contributed so much on improving economic performances. In this regard, we quote the proposal of Rodriguez (2006) Academic position we support in this paper is closely aligned with that of Rodrik et al. (2002) and we assume that the choice of different trade openness measures in empirical studies constitutes a substantial cause of the divergent stands mentioned above.
Trade measures used by Gwartney et al. (1998) , Dollar and Kraay (2002) , Warner (2003) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003) are different from those used by Rodriguez (2006) or by Rodrik et al. (2002) . Empirical literature includes several indices for measuring trade openness degrees. Yanikkaya (2002) divided the existing openness measures into five categories:
First, trade shares measure, which is exports plus imports divided by GDP.
The second category includes measures of trade barriers that include average tariff rates, export taxes, total taxes on international trade, and indices of non-tariff barriers. In this regard we mention the Dollar and Kraay (2002) openness measure.
The third category includes bilateral payments arrangements as a measure of the trade orientation of countries. The fourth category uses the exchange rate. The most commonly used measure in this category is the black market premium that shows the success of the rationing function of prices in the foreign exchange market Finally, indices of trade orientation (such as Leamer (1988) openness index, Dollar (1992) price distortion and variability index, Sachs and Warner (1995) The purpose of this section does not consist on relating the main features of all these indicators but calls into question studies that support the existence of a strong relationship between trade and growth through the exposure of conceptual shortcomings of three commonly used trade measures in these studies, namely the Sachs and Warner (1995) , Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003) trade indexes.
The "Globalisers and Non-Globalisers" Dollar and Kraay (2002) Openness Index
In their study, -Trade, growth and poverty‖, Dollar and Kraay concluded that economic openness improves growth. According to these authors, countries they called "globalisers" knew a rise of 2.1% of their growth rates between 1970's and 1980's. Growth rate of these countries passed, in average, from 2.9% to 5% during these two decades. Whereas, during the same period, countries they called "non globalisers" recorded a decrease of 1.9% of their growth rates.
But the manner by which Dollar and Kraay has classified countries as "globalisers" and "non globalisers" is subject to critiques. These critiques have been addressed by Nye and Reddy (2002) who considered that Dollar and Kraay criteria's appreciations of openness degrees were 'arbitrary'. But some countries, that have been catalogued as "non globalisers" because they haven't established tariffs reductions reforms in the specified period, have in reality recorded similar or sometimes better levels in term of commercial exchanges and tariffs levels than "globalisers" ones.
Classifying countries exclusively on the basis of -efforts of reforms‖ conduced Dollar and
Kraay to consider some countries as "non globalisers" although they were more open to international trade than "globalisers" ones and this inadequate appreciation of openness degrees lead to biased results.
In fact, when classifying countries according to -levels of openness‖, Nye and Reddy (2002) founded different results than those of Dollar and Kraay (2002) . According to Nye and Reddy (2002) : « non-globalizers saw an acceleration of 1.7 percentage points in their growth rates between 1985-89 and 1995-97, whereas globalizers saw an increase of 1.3 percentage points ».
The Sachs and Warner's (1995) Index
According to Sachs and Warner (1995) , a country is classified as -closed‖ if it displays at least one of the following criteria:
-An average tariff rates of 40% or more.
-A non tariff barriers covering 40% or more of trade transactions.
-A black market exchange rate that is, at least 20 percent lower than the official exchange rate.
-A state monopoly on major exports.
-A socialist economic system (as defined by Kornai (1992) ).
The aggregated indicator of Sachs and Warner takes into account the inhibitory effect of the tariffs and non tariffs barriers and the opportunity costs caused by black market activities on commercial transactions.
For Sachs and Warner, the existence of a black market premium on exchange transactions could have the same effects of a formal tax. For example, if local exporters buy raw material with foreign currency acquired at black market, and sell their finished products with the legal exchange rate, they will undergo exchange losses.
In addition, Sachs and Warner introduced the 'socialist economic system' variable to demonstrate the negative relationship between socialist regimes, with centralized economies, and openness to international trade.
In spite of his original contribution in measuring country's openness degrees, the Sachs and
Warner's index has also been exposed to critiques. In this regard, we quote the comments of
Rodriguez (2006): « Whereas we found the rationale for including these variables jointly into an index reasonable, we also found that the explanatory power of this variable in growth regressions came almost exclusively from its use of the state monopoly of exports and black-market premium variable: an index that combined just these two indicators had as much explanatory power as the Sachs-Warner variable, and an index that combined the other three variables (socialism, tariffs and non-tariff barriers) did not enter significantly into the regression ».
In addition, the variables" State monopoly of exports "and" black market premium ", which support the largest explanatory weight of the aggregated indicator, include measures bias. 
The Wacziarg and Welch (2003) Index
The Wacziarg and Welch (2003) indicator constitutes an update of the Sachs and Warner (1995) indicator. According to Wacziarg and Welch (2003) , « the Sachs-Warner methodology was followed as closely as possible ».
The contribution of Wacziarg and Welch compared to the initial conceptual measure of Sashs and Warner can be summarized through the following items:
The Sachs and Warner (1995) 
(X+M/GDP), AN EXHAUSTIVE INDEX FOR MEASURING TRADE OPENNESS
The conceptual shortcomings mentioned above conduced some authors to express a « considerable scepticism as to the appropriate interpretation of their results »Rodriguez (2006).
We will demonstrate in this section that the X+M/GDP openness index is less exposed to such inconsistencies. Using this index in our model will provide more relevant results.
The common shortcomings of openness indexes provided by Sachs and Warner (1995), Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003) is that respective authors do not evaluate uniformly openness degrees of countries.
This problem is often due to unavailability of data's. Sachs and Warner (1995) used the World Bank's data's in order to record 29 African countries, but they have not applied the same criteria's for countries that have not been subject of the "Adjustment in Africa's program". Wacziarg and Welch (2003) have also faced similar problems: « Non tariff barrier data comparable to those used by Sachs-Warner are hard to obtain.
Sachs-Warner used average non tariff barrier data for 1985-88 from the Barro-Lee data set, itself based on data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Their data cover only 29 countries for the period 1995-98. Where comparable data on non tariff barriers were missing, the countries were classified based only on the other four Sachs-Warner criteria ».
The problem of non uniformity of openness country's degrees can also be explained by the reliance of respective authors on given openness criteria's in expense of others. For example, Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003) have relied primarily on "Black market premium" and " state monopoly on major exports " criteria and they accorded less importance to the other constituents of their aggregate index. The (X+M/GDP) index is not exposed to such inconsistencies. It is not subject to evaluations bias related to the unavailability of statistical data's and identifies uniformly openness degrees since it does not favours a given criteria at the expense of another. All countries will be so catalogued on the basis of the same criteria, namely the sum of their exports and exports divided on their GDP. In other words, the unit of measure will be applied univocally to all countries of the sample. The third major technical shortcoming of previous indexes is that they evaluate countries openness degrees on the basis of 'efforts of reforms' and this evaluation method lead to several classification bias. (X+M/GDP) index, which evaluates openness degrees on the basis of ‗level of openness' avoids this classification bias. When using (X+M/GDP) index, countries opened to international trade will not be falsely catalogued as so only because they have not recorded liberal policies reforms in a specified period. Arguments mentioned above allow as reporting that the use of trade share ratio in growth regression provide credible findings.
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF TRADE OPENNESS ON GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Presentation of Variables
Our model takes the following basic form:
Were ( dollars. Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 4 The sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. Source: World Bank 5 Gross capital formation consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings.
Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress."
(Dem) and (Polstability) are two institutional variables who serve to evaluate respectively the degree of democratisation and political stability of a given country. These governance estimates « are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. This implies that virtually, all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes» (Kaufmann et al., 2010) .
So the economic relationship we are interested in identifying is:
The variables contained in our model are particularly influent on growth rate evolution of developing countries. (Lib) is a proxy of economic liberalisation, (Dem) is a proxy of political liberalisation, (Invest) and (Inf) are standard variables in empirical growth literature and (Polstab) evaluates the domestic political country's efforts in order to insure an efficient institutional framework.
Findings and Discussion
The estimation method that we followed is to apply OLS (Least Square Dummy Variables) to our model, in which we have introduced a dummy variable for each country. The objective is to estimate our fixed effects model after correcting the (t) of Student from heteroscedasticty using the White method. This method provides the same values for the parameters estimated by OLS, the difference lies in the estimated standard deviations. Correcting errors from heteroscedasticity provides robust estimators. The estimations results are as follow: The Fisher-test indicates that our explanatory variables are jointly significant at 1% level and the R-Squared value indicates that they explain 35% of the amount of variance of growth rates.
The negative sign of the estimated coefficient relative to the variable (Inf) was expected.
Inflation exerts an inhibitory effect on growth. The price increase reduces consumption and therefore production and employment. It also reduces investment because of the rise of the nominal wages and raw materials prices, both in local and foreign currency (Fenira, 2014) .
The variable (LnRES) is not statistically significant. But we can explain its negative correlation with the dependent variable by the fact that reserves accumulation is associated to less investmentoriented resources.
The positive relationship between investment and growth was also expected. Investment is widely recognised as key driver of economic growth.
The results indicate that institutional variables are not statistically significant at the 10% conventional level but these two variables are positively associated with growth. This positive association can be explained as follow:
Improving democratic standards and political stability in developing countries improves the degree of property rights protection and social cohesion, which has a positive effect on macroeconomic performance. Against by, an inefficient institutional environment improves the rent seeking behaviour, promotes corruption and arbitrary decisions and reduces the state control on the informal sector, which reduces investment and economic growth (Fenira, 2014) .
Considering the impact of democracy variable on growth, a 1% improvement in democracy index, as established by Kaufmann et al. (2012) ameliorates the growth rate of GDP by 0.71%. In other words, a developing country that in the specified period have improved its democracy index by one percentage point have experienced, on average, a GDP growth that is 0.71 percentage point more than a country that haven't insured the same institutional effort.
The result we are mostly interested in concerns the effect of trade openness index on growth.
Estimation results shows that (X+M/GDP) ratio is statically significant at 1% level but it has a very low marginal effect in explaining growth variations.
A 1% improvement of (X+M/GDP) ratio in developing countries during the 1996-2012 period ameliorated growth rate of GDP only by 0.05%.
Twenty eight years after the establishment of the Uruguay round agreements, openness to international trade has weakly contributed in improving economic growth in developing countries.
Such a result can be explained by three distinct arguments:
The first argument refers to ‗preferences erosion' (Alexandraki and Lankes, 2004) , that is the loss in comparative advantage in foreign markets incurred by some exporters « as a result of preferential trade treatment-both unilateral and reciprocal. Preference erosion can occur when export partners eliminate preferences, expand the number of preference beneficiaries, or lower their most-favoured-nation tariff without lowering preferential tariffs proportionately ». The weak contribution of trade openness on growth in developing countries can also be explained by the lost revenue in agricultural exports earning. This loss of income is due to the support accorded by OECD countries to their agricultural producers. This argument has been argued by Tokarick (2003) , according to which, « many countries; mainly the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries with their high per capita income;
provide support to their agricultural producers through a complex array of policy measures, such as tariffs that discriminate against agricultural imports, subsidies that encourage greater production and export, and input subsidies that effectively lower the cost of production. These support policies are often cited as important obstacle to more rapid development of low-income countries, as well as The third argument refers to the reduction of public receipts caused by the reduction of trade taxes revenues.
Trade taxes revenues in developing countries have become less important over the last twenty years because of the tariffs reductions, but these taxes remain a crucial source of financing in these governments, were they represent generally the fifth, and often more, of total tax revenues income countries produced a loss of tax revenue that corresponds to 2.5% of GDP, namely one sixth of their total tax revenues. For high or middle income countries the losses were less pronounced but even so significant.
The losses in taxes revenues and so in public income affect negatively the amount of public investment and so economic growth.
EXPLAINING THE TRADE OPENNESS POLICIES ORIENTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In this section, we tried to explain the causes that led developing countries to support liberal policies although these policies haven't contributed so much in improving economic performances.
Knowing the liberal orientations of international economic organisation's guidelines and knowing the great influence of these organisations on developing country's policies establishment, we involved in a third equation the role of these economic agencies by regressing the amount of official development assistance and official aid on (X+M/GDP) ratio.
The equation takes the following form:
Where ( Openness to international trade in developing countries was largely motivated by the desire to obtain loans and aids from international organisations, which themselves support any liberal orientation.
CONCLUSION
We demonstrated in this paper that openness to international trade during the1996-2012 period have weekly contributed in improving growth in developing countries. Assuming that trade openness index conceptualisation matters in growth regressions, we demonstrated that trade share ratio, used as variable of interest in our model, is less exposed to conceptual shortcomings faced by three influent trade openness indexes, namely the Sachs and Warner (1995) We explained the weak contribution of trade openness policies on economic growth by the deterioration of external balance caused by the ‗preferences erosion' phenomenon, the OECD countries support to their agricultural producers and the losses in taxes revenue.
As regards to the causes that motivated developing countries to liberalise their trade systems, we argued that trade liberalization policies were largely motivated by the desire to obtain loans and aids from international organisations. Economic crisis faced by these countries during the 1970's and 1980's constrained them to resort to international organisations, like World Bank, International
Monetary Found or World Trade Organisation which support liberal orientations. These countries had to conform with international agencies recommendations in order to obtain loans and aids and liberalization of trade systems, among other recommendations relating to political and institutional factors, constitutes one of the major conditions for obtaining loans.
